In recent years, the concept of the “Turkic world” has increasingly resonated in the political, cultural, and academic discourse of Eurasia. The Organization of Turkic States regards the commonality of history, language, culture, and identity as one of the important foundations of cooperation among member states. The conceptual document “Vision of the Turkic World – 2040” also sets the task of further deepening coordination and interaction among them.
As a linguistic, cultural, and civilizational concept, the “Turkic world” has objective foundations. Turkic peoples are united by numerous historical, linguistic, and cultural ties. However, if linguistic and cultural commonality is interpreted as evidence of historical, let alone political or territorial, belonging, a fundamental question arises: does the presence in a given region of peoples speaking Turkic languages mean that this region is historically part of some unified political space of the “Turkic world”? Additional opportunities to reflect on this question are provided by turning to the multilayered history of Xinjiang.
The recently published books in China, “History of the Xinjiang Region of China” (《中国新疆地区历史》) and “History of Religions of the Xinjiang Region of China” (《中国新疆地区宗教史》), offer substantial historical material for such an analysis. Examining, respectively, the general history of the region and the history of its religions, the authors present the development of Xinjiang not as a one-line process tied to a single people, language, or faith, but as a centuries-long history of migrations and interactions among various peoples, the coexistence of religions, and continuous contacts between civilizations. At the same time, both works consider the region’s history in the context of the formation and development of a multiethnic Chinese state.
When discussing the relationship between Xinjiang and the “Turkic world,” it is first necessary to distinguish between linguistic, ethnic, cultural-civilizational, and state-political categories. Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Turkish belong to the Turkic language family. Between a number of peoples of Xinjiang and the peoples of Central Asia there have historically been numerous ties in language, customs, literature, music, art, and everyday culture. This is an objective part of the region’s history.
However, linguistic kinship primarily indicates genetic and historical connections between languages. In itself, it does not mean the identity of peoples and certainly does not determine the historical or political belonging of a territory.
There are many such examples in world history. English, German, and Dutch belong to the Germanic group of languages, yet this does not imply the existence of a unified political “Germanic space.” French, Spanish, and Italian belong to the Romance group, but the linguistic kinship of these peoples is likewise not a basis for defining or redrawing state borders.
Languages can spread across state borders. Cultural traditions can be shared by peoples living in different countries. Ethnic groups can historically settle on both sides of modern borders. However, the processes of state and territorial formation have never been determined solely by the linguistic factor.
Therefore, a direct leap from the statement “the population speaks a Turkic language” to the conclusion that a certain territory has the corresponding historical-political belonging means conflating two fundamentally different categories: linguistic classification and the history of statehood.
One of the features of the book “History of the Xinjiang Region of China” is that the region’s history is considered in a long historical perspective.
The study covers the period from antiquity to the present and shows that the historical development of Xinjiang does not begin with the appearance of any single people or state. It was formed through long-term population migrations, interactions among ethnic groups, the смена of political entities, and contacts among various civilizations.
At different times, the territory of present-day Xinjiang was inhabited and shaped by the Sakas, Yuezhi, Wusun, Qiang, Xiongnu, Han Chinese, Sogdians, Xianbei, Rouran, Turks, Uyghurs, Mongols, and other peoples and population groups. The Turks and later Turkic-speaking peoples are undoubtedly an important part of the region’s history. However, they do not exhaust its content and cannot serve as the sole starting point for explaining all of Xinjiang’s earlier history.
An important methodological question arises here. The long-term presence of a particular people in a certain territory does not in itself mean that this territory permanently acquires an exclusive ethnic affiliation.
Otherwise, virtually any region of Eurasia that experienced population migrations, changes of states, and cultural interaction could, in different historical periods, be attributed to entirely different modern political spaces. Under such an approach, historical analysis is inevitably replaced by the retrospective projection of modern political and national categories into the distant past.
This is especially evident in relation to Central Eurasia, where for millennia peoples moved, states emerged and disappeared, political centers changed, trade routes shifted, and administrative borders were redrawn.
The book also pays great attention to another side of Xinjiang’s history—the evolution of the system of state administration in the region. The authors trace it from the establishment of the Protectorate of the Western Regions under the Han dynasty, through the Tang administrative structures of Anxi and Beiting, to the institution of the Ili General Governor during the Qing dynasty and the establishment of Xinjiang Province in 1884.
Thus, when studying the history of the region, it is proposed to take into account not only the migrations of the peoples of the Eurasian steppe, but also the development of state institutions, economic ties, administrative governance, population movement, and long-term interaction between different parts of China and the neighboring spaces of Eurasia.
An attempt to define the historical essence of Xinjiang solely through one linguistic or ethnic feature inevitably leaves a significant part of its complex history outside the analysis.
If the region’s general history shows the impossibility of explaining Xinjiang through the history of a single people, then “History of Religions of the Xinjiang Region of China” draws attention to another important aspect of the issue.
The religious development of Xinjiang is likewise impossible to present as a direct and continuous history of a single confessional space. At different historical stages, ancient local beliefs existed here, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism spread, and later Daoism, Nestorianism, and Manichaeism appeared. For a considerable period, Buddhism was one of the leading religions of the region.
Islam began to penetrate the southern areas of Xinjiang approximately in the late 9th to early 10th century. Its spread continued for several centuries, and only later did Islam gradually occupy a dominant position among a significant part of the local population. At the same time, the region’s religious diversity did not disappear completely. This historical sequence is of fundamental importance.
The contemporary religious affiliation of the population cannot be mechanically projected onto events of two thousand years ago or earlier. The religious culture of the ancestors of the region’s modern peoples changed repeatedly and was influenced by various spiritual and cultural traditions. Thus, ethnicity, language, and religion in Xinjiang’s history never constituted a fixed and inseparable unity once and for all.
This is also evidenced by the region’s historical and cultural heritage. Buddhist cave complexes, murals, and written monuments of Kucha, Khotan, and Gaochang, as well as evidence of the presence of Zoroastrianism, Nestorianism, and Manichaeism, show Xinjiang as a space of long-term interaction among various religions and civilizations. If its history is described exclusively as the successive formation of a Turkic-Islamic space, a significant part of the pre-Islamic history and the richest layer of the region’s cultural heritage will fall outside such a narrative.
Xinjiang is located in the heart of the Eurasian continent. One of the most characteristic features of its history was not isolation or belonging to a single cultural tradition, but, on the contrary, its connecting role.
For centuries, people, goods, technologies, artistic traditions, and religious ideas from Central China, the Mongolian Plateau, Central, South, and West Asia met here.
Thanks to this, Xinjiang became one of the most characteristic spaces of civilizational exchange along the ancient Silk Road. That is precisely why recognizing Xinjiang’s deep historical and cultural ties with Central Asia and Turkic-speaking peoples should not lead to the simplistic conclusion that it belongs exclusively to one cultural or historical tradition.
Connection does not mean identity. Linguistic kinship does not mean political belonging. Cultural commonality is also not, in itself, a basis for territorial conclusions.
The history of Central Eurasia generally does not fit well into the notion of strictly separated civilizational spaces. For centuries, numerous overlapping identities and connections existed here. The same territories could simultaneously be part of several cultural, commercial, and intellectual spaces without forming a single state.
It is precisely such an approach that makes it possible to recognize the real historical ties of Xinjiang with Central Asia while also considering the region’s history in the context of China’s historical development.
From an academic perspective, the concepts of “Turkic languages,” “the culture of Turkic peoples,” “Turkic cultural heritage,” and “interaction among Turkic cultures” are entirely justified and significant areas of research.
Xinjiang’s historical ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and other territories of Central Asia in the fields of language, literature, music, traditions, and everyday culture also deserve deep and objective study.
However, such studies require several fundamental distinctions. A linguistic concept should not automatically be turned into a territorial one. Cultural unity is not a category of state sovereignty. Ethnic kinship does not mean political belonging. This is one of the important meanings of the books “History of the Xinjiang Region of China” and “History of Religions of the Xinjiang Region of China.” They make it possible to move beyond attempts to explain Xinjiang through the prism of a single people, language, or religion.
The Turkic cultural component occupies an important place in Xinjiang’s history. Its ties with Central Asia are also an integral part of the region’s history. However, the modern ethnic, linguistic, and religious structure of Xinjiang did not exist in an unchanged form since ancient times. It took shape over centuries under the influence of population migrations, interactions among peoples, the spread of religions, the activity of state institutions, and constant contacts between civilizations.
In this context, the concept of the “Turkic world” itself requires precision. It has clear content as a linguistic, cultural, historical, and contemporary space of cooperation among Turkic states and peoples. However, its use as a category of historical-territorial or state-political belonging leads to the conflation of different levels of historical analysis.
It is indicative that the modern Organization of Turkic States is an intergovernmental mechanism for cooperation among sovereign states. Its documents emphasize the commonality of history, language, culture, and identity, but at the same time are based on the principles of sovereign equality of states, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, and non-interference in internal affairs. Thus, cultural and linguistic commonality can cross state borders without calling those borders themselves into question.
For Kazakhstan, such a distinction is of special importance. The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the founding states of the Organization of Turkic States and consistently advocates strengthening cultural, linguistic, educational, economic, and humanitarian ties within the Turkic world. At the same time, the Kazakh approach does not imply turning Turkic commonality into a geopolitical or territorial project. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated directly in 2026 that the Organization of Turkic States is “not a geopolitical project and not a military organization,” defining it primarily as a platform for trade, economic, technological, digital, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. Such an approach also corresponds to the basic principles of the OTS itself, which provide for respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of internationally recognized borders, and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
This logic is consistently reflected in Kazakhstan’s relations with China. The Republic of Kazakhstan proceeds from the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. In the Joint Statement of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China of July 3, 2024, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to these principles, opposed external interference in internal affairs and the politicization of human rights issues. Kazakhstan also reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the One China principle, according to which the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing all of China. This position is part of Kazakhstan’s consistent foreign policy line and has been repeatedly confirmed in bilateral documents and official statements.
In such a context, the historical, linguistic, and cultural ties of Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking peoples with the population of Xinjiang can and should be regarded as an important part of the common heritage of Central Eurasia, without conflicting with the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Kazakhstan, Turkic cultural heritage, Central Asian regional identity, and strategic partnership with China are not mutually exclusive categories. On the contrary, their combination reflects Kazakhstan’s characteristic foreign policy model, based on respect for international law, good-neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs, and the development of cultural ties without politicizing them. It is precisely such a distinction between cultural commonality and state-political belonging that creates the most sustainable basis for cooperation in the complex and diverse space of modern Eurasia.
