The first “China–Central Asia” summit, held in Xi’an on May 18–19, 2023, opened the door to the development of interregional cooperation mechanisms between the two major regions of Eurasia. It launched new momentum for political, economic, and cultural-humanitarian cooperation within the “C+C5” format and further advancement in the 21st century.
China and the five Central Asian countries have established comprehensive strategic partnerships and reached important consensus on building a China–Central Asia community with a shared future. The countries have signed agreements on jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and are actively aligning it with their national development strategies: Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol” New Economic Policy, the Kyrgyz Republic’s National Development Program until 2026, Tajikistan’s National Development Strategy until 2030, Turkmenistan’s revival of the Great Silk Road, and Uzbekistan’s Development Strategy for 2022–2026. Thus, the 3,300 km of common border between China and Central Asia has become a bridge of good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation—an example of a new type of international relations.
The rapid development and success of relations between China and Central Asian countries are largely due to the right approach to cooperation. President Xi Jinping summarized this in four principles: mutual respect, good-neighborliness and friendship, mutual assistance, and mutual benefit. A high level of political mutual trust is a key feature of China–Central Asia relations. Head-of-state diplomacy has played a leading role. Kazakhstan, due to geographical proximity, strong ties with the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, and energy cooperation potential, enjoys an “eternal comprehensive strategic partnership” with China. Uzbekistan, though it does not share a border with China, is no less important a partner and has established an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership.” Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan maintain “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with China. These distinctions reflect Beijing’s priorities and strategic outlook regarding each Central Asian country.
A milestone in the development of interregional cooperation mechanisms was the online summit in January 2022, marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Central Asia. During the virtual meeting with leaders of the five Central Asian countries, President Xi Jinping declared: “Regardless of changes in the international environment or China’s future development, China will always remain a good neighbor, partner, friend, and brother that the countries of Central Asia can trust and rely on.”
Further Steps Toward Building a China–Central Asia Community with a Shared Future
The online summit of January 2022 gave impetus to intensified interaction between the leaders of China and Central Asia, which extended far beyond a single meeting. As early as February 2022, Central Asian leaders traveled to China to attend the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. In June, the decision was made to establish a “China–Central Asia” heads-of-state meeting mechanism, with Xi’an—historic capital of the Silk Road—chosen as the first host city. In September, President Xi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and took part in the SCO Samarkand Summit—his first overseas trip since the start of the pandemic. These developments laid a strong foundation for building the China–Central Asia community with a shared future.
China and Central Asia also cooperate within multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations (UN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and now the “China–Central Asia” Summit, the second of which will be held in June 2025 in Astana. These frameworks serve as important guarantees for the development of relations between China and Central Asia.
Geopolitical geography has also facilitated interregional cooperation. Central Asia lies at the heart of the Eurasian continent, bordered by Russia to the north, China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region serves not only as China’s gateway to Central Asia but also as a bridge for civilizational dialogue, with three millennia of shared history—from sporadic contacts to a strategic partnership.
Another factor encouraging stronger China–Central Asia cooperation was the February 2022 outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as well as rising global and regional instability (e.g., the Middle East, the Kyrgyz–Tajik border, Afghanistan). Central Asian countries faced shocks and challenges to development. In this context, ensuring peace and long-term regional stability, particularly through enhanced security cooperation, became a fundamental pillar of interregional cooperation.
China and Central Asian countries are jointly addressing regional security threats, including combating the “three evil forces” (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), transnational organized crime, cybercrime, and drug trafficking. Within the SCO, the parties have signed counter-terrorism agreements and held joint drills. Cooperation in border management is deepening, with countries standing firmly against external interference and incitement of “color revolutions.” Effective mechanisms, such as the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) headquartered in Tashkent, have been established to safeguard regional security.
New Drivers for Growth: Connectivity, Trade, and Energy
Another example of strengthened interregional cooperation was the COVID-19 pandemic. China supported Central Asian countries in fighting the virus and in vaccine distribution. In 2022 alone, at the height of the pandemic, China supplied the region with 50 million doses of vaccine. It also transferred vaccine production technology and waived intellectual property rights, enabling mass production in Uzbekistan. The parties intend to deepen cooperation in biosafety management and improving international health standards.
China and Central Asia consider resolving the Afghan issue essential for regional stability. The parties continue to assist Afghanistan in restoring peace and promoting economic integration into the regional economy.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a key engine for economic integration. By aligning infrastructure strategies, it can stimulate development across Central Asia and promote regional connectivity.
Strengthening connectivity is a top priority in China–Central Asia cooperation. A vast infrastructure network has emerged, including highways, railways, air routes, oil and gas pipelines, and border checkpoints. These networks have facilitated trade and people-to-people exchanges and laid the foundation for Asia–Europe logistics chains.
Transport corridors linking China with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as China with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, have been completed. The China–Kazakhstan section of the “Western China–Western Europe” highway has also been launched. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and cross-border lines connecting China with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are under construction. “China–Europe” rail routes now link 125 Chinese cities with over 230 cities worldwide—25 European countries and 11 Asian nations. As of the end of November 2024, more than 100,000 trains had traveled these routes, carrying over 50,000 types of goods in 53 categories, including automobiles, machinery, electronics, and epidemic prevention materials. The total value of these shipments exceeds $420 billion.
Over the past 30 years, Chinese energy companies have built extensive cooperation with Central Asia. China works with Kazakhstan in the oil sector, with Turkmenistan on natural gas, with Uzbekistan on oil and gas infrastructure (more than 500 billion cubic meters of gas have been delivered to China via the China–Central Asia pipeline over 14 years, with the fourth D-line via Tajikistan under construction), and with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on renewable energy. China has also supported the construction of thermal, wind, and hydropower plants, is exploring opportunities for joint solar projects, and is promoting a transition to low-carbon energy. It is worth highlighting China’s involvement in nuclear energy projects: CNNC and CGN participate in joint uranium mine development in Central Asia.
The Road Ahead: Toward a New Era of Regional Cooperation
In developing the “China–Central Asia” cooperation mechanisms, the six countries continue to strengthen ties in trade, investment, and finance, while also enhancing customs coordination, inspections, and quarantine procedures. Since 2021, China has been Central Asia’s largest trading partner. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $94.82 billion—up from $89.4 billion in 2023—setting a new record. Chinese investment in the region has already exceeded $50 billion. The countries are also deepening cooperation in agriculture, new energy, e-commerce, the green and digital economy, AI, big data, and cloud computing—creating new engines of joint growth.
To fully realize the BRI’s potential, work must intensify on operationalizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR or Middle Corridor), connecting China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to Europe. The construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway (CKU) is also critical. It will accelerate overland transport to the Middle East, help landlocked countries overcome trade bottlenecks, and generate transit revenue from Chinese goods.
Despite debates about the CKU railway’s economic feasibility, it holds great promise. Like the Khorgos International Center for Cross-Border Cooperation on the Kazakhstan–China border, the CKU line could become a “window of opportunity” for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Given the close ties between southern Xinjiang and Central Asia, the project represents a revival of the Silk Road’s land route. Official Beijing has sent a clear signal: China honors its commitments and upholds the principles of friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. It will continue to support all strategic projects within the “China–Central Asia” framework—while reducing reliance on Russian transit networks.
Initially, Kazakhstan saw the CKU railway as a competitor to the Trans-Caspian route, but now Astana demonstrates understanding of its neighbors’ national interests. This shift contributes to positive dynamics in Central Asia’s regionalism and reflects the ability of China and Central Asian states to coordinate effectively—bilaterally and multilaterally—based on mutual respect and shared benefit. This approach reinforces the belief that, if continued as in the “first golden thirty years” of China–Central Asia relations, the “second golden thirty years” can elevate interregional cooperation to an even higher and more harmonious level. After all, there is no need to change the spirit of harmony (和 / hé) that underpins the success of “China–Central Asia” cooperation.
Thus, for more than three decades, China and the Central Asian countries have engaged in comprehensive, deep, and fruitful cooperation—including in both traditional and non-traditional security. In the face of growing international complexity and global challenges, China and Central Asia must continue to strengthen security cooperation, deepen strategic partnership, and jointly build a China–Central Asia community with a shared future—consolidating the foundations of regional cooperation for years to come.
Moment from the Xi’an Summit, 2023. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC
Erkin BAIDAROV. Specially for the China Studies Center
